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Introduction
Over the past five decades, East Asia has emerged as a region with several spectacular stories of catch-up development. The World Bank identified the eight highest-performing Asian economies (HPAEs) as Japan, the "Four Asian Tigers" (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) and the three newly industrialised economies (NIEs) -Indonesia, ABOUT THE AUTHOR Khuong M. Vu (sppkmv@nus.edu.sg) is Assistant Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. He received his PhD in Public Policy from Harvard University. His research interests include the determinants of economic growth and competitiveness, impact of information technology on development and global best practices for enhancing good governance.
Malaysia and Thailand. 1 While the "Four Asian Tigers" and the NIEs have made impressive achievements in economic growth and development, gaps in the pace and efficiency of their growth have been substantial. 2 Furthermore, the slower recovery from the 1997 Asian financial crisis of the NIEs relative to that of the "Four Asian Tigers" suggests that these two groups have some significant disparities in the fundamental factors underlying their economic performance. 3 China and Vietnam have achieved remarkable economic growth since the launch of their economic reforms (China in 1978 and Vietnam in 1986). However, the two countries have also experienced a divergence that resembles that of the Four Tigers versus the NIEs. Figure 1 , which plots the relationship between per capita GDP and GDP growth rate, shows that China and Vietnam have followed very similar growth patterns, but Vietnam's growth has been below China's by a notable margin. 4 Furthermore, Vietnam's per capita GDP growth path appears to follow Indonesia's (from the $200 level) and Thailand's (from the $400 level), while China's shows a decisive deviation from these patterns (Figures 2A and 2B) .
Apart from China, it is important to note that India, which has achieved accelerated economic growth since its launch of reforms in 1991, has outperformed Vietnam since 2004, and both India and China are expected to be notably more resilient than Vietnam in this current global economic crisis (Figure 3 ).
These observations suggest that the gap in economic performance between China and Vietnam is something more serious than a simple quantitative difference in economic growth over a given period. 5 This paper aims to gain insights into the gap in economic performance and the main factors behind it. Although economic reforms in the two countries were launched nearly a decade apart, they have strikingly similar features. These similarities lay in the circumstances leading to reform, the initial socio-economic development conditions and the approaches to reform and economic management.
Similarities in the Factors Leading to Economic Reform
The economic reforms in both China and Vietnam were initiated under circumstances that provided three critical factors for change: receptivity, crisis and opportunity.
Receptivity: During their pre-reform periods (China: 1949 (China: -1978 Vietnam: 1954 Vietnam: -1986 ), the two countries made extraordinary efforts to build their socialist economies, but they experienced failure rather than success. China was point out the potential impact of "powerful exogenous factors" such as "Vietnam's regional location and the trajectory of the regional economy, the timing of natural resource (oil) exploitation, the entrepreneurial vitality of the Vietnamese, access to a sizeable and dynamic emigrant community, and the onset of peace." On the other hand Dollars observed, "Vietnam is one of the fastest growing economies in the world in the 1990s, yet by many conventional measures, it has poor economic policies". See David Dollar, "Reform, Growth, and impoverished by the catastrophic Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, while the Vietnamese economy was ruined by the collectivisation of land, nationalisation of privately-owned industrial and trading establishments and socialist ideology-driven initiatives.
After nearly 30 years of economic development with an annual growth rate of 2.7 per cent, China's per capita GDP in 1978 was only US$164 (Table 1) . 6 Nathan describes the beginning of China's reform as a time when "agriculture was stagnant, industrial production was low, and the people's living standards had not increased in twenty years". 7 In 1986, Vietnam was listed among the poorest countries in the world, with per capita GDP at $203. The per capita GDP growth rate was only 1.4 per cent over the 10 years following the country's official reunification in 1976 and the country was heavily reliant on the Soviet Union for economic aid.
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These frustrating economic development patterns caused the Chinese and Vietnamese people to long desperately for the government to change the way it managed the economy. For Vietnam in 1986, the receptivity to change was even greater due to the initial success of the economic reforms in China. The similar circumstances leading to reforms in China and Vietnam, as presented above, are behind the fact that the reforms in both countries were "more economic than political" as observed by Fforde and Vylder.
Crisis

12
Similarities in the Development Conditions at the Launch of Reforms
At the launch of their economic reforms, China and Vietnam were at similar developmental positions in many areas, including basic human capital, economy and infrastructure, as depicted in Table 1 .
With regard to human capital, the two countries had comparable levels of literacy and nutrition. While life expectancy was somewhat higher in China, Vietnam had a slight edge in terms of adult literacy rate and the average age of the population. The Chinese and Vietnamese economies at the launch of reform were underdeveloped, with per capita GDP at $165 for China and $203 for Vietnam. 13 Pertaining to the GDP structure, the industrial sector was dominant for China (48.2 per cent), while for Vietnam, agriculture was the largest sector (38.1 per cent). This difference between the two countries posed both advantages and disadvantages for each in its early stages of economic reform. For China, the large industrial sector, which was mainly state-owned, provided a stronger base for industrialisation, but its serious inefficiency, overstaffing and lack of market orientation would require costly efforts and strong political will to 12 reform.
14 For Vietnam, the larger agricultural sector could allow it to "leap frog" with new industrial development projects. However, its smaller industrial sector also meant that the country would have difficulty in acquiring skilled labour and building a network of supporting industries at the beginning of its industrialisation.
With respect to the rural economy, 80 per cent of the population in both countries lived in rural areas, and the two countries had a similar level of cereal yield per hectare (2,802 kg for China and 2,715 kg for Vietnam). Both China and Vietnam had a very low level of openness as well as severely 
Similarities in Reform Approach and Implementation
While the reforms in China and Vietnam were initiated under the pressure of economic despair and the critical need to find a new way to build the economy, the paramount concern of the leadership in both countries was to maintain political stability and the absolute power of the Communist Party. As a result, to justify the legitimacy of the political system, both countries chose a "gradualist" approach to reform with a special focus on economic growth. Table 2 , which lists the reform milestones and major initiatives undertaken by China and Vietnam over their reform periods, shows some striking similarities:
• The launch of reforms was a landmark decision of the Communist Party led by a new leadership team.
• Unshackling the agricultural sector (which accounted for over 80 per cent of the labour force in each country): both countries introduced the "household contract responsibility system". This step turned households into production units, giving farmers the incentive to maximise their efforts. This officially took place in China in 1980 and in Vietnam in 1988, that is, about two years after the launch of the reforms in each country. 15 For comparison, the figure was 8.2 for the Philippines in 1978. • Legalising the formation and growth of the private sector. This step was taken by China in 1982 through a constitutional amendment, placing the private sector as a "supplement to the socialist economy". Vietnam followed suit in 1990 with the introduction of the "Private Business Law". • SOE and "level playing field" reforms were conducted in three phases Table 2 also indicates that Vietnam has accelerated the pace of its reforms to catch up with China. The time lag for similar reform milestones/initiatives has decreased over time. For example, Vietnam legalised the private sector in 1990, eight years after China, but it levelled the business playing field with a unified enterprise law in 1999, only five years after China, and it revised this law at the same time as China did in 2006. Vietnam also passed its investment law in 2005, which fundamentally created a level playing field for the business sector, while no similar law has been passed in China. This observation suggests that Vietnam has become increasingly proactive and independent in fostering its economic reforms, especially in the legal framework area. The key difference between the two countries, therefore, lies not in a willingness to carry out reforms, but likely in other leadership-related factors such as vision, commitment and the effectiveness of implementation.
Dissimilarities
The two countries have notable dissimilarities, such as population scale, historical characteristics and effectiveness of leadership. The scale and historical factors give each country certain advantages, which are expected to have a significant impact on economic performance. The sheer size of China makes it remarkably attractive as a market as well as a source of skilled and unskilled labour. China's longer period of peaceful development makes its political system less preoccupied with war legacies and more accountable for the country's developmental progress.
On the other hand, Vietnam's smaller size perhaps makes it more nimble. In addition, Vietnam has a "latecomer" advantage that allows it to study and learn from China's reform experiences without having to pay for the costs of experimentation. The rise of China has also made Vietnam a highly attractive place for FDI as foreign investors try to diversify their investments with the formula "China plus one".
As such, each country can leverage some significant advantages from its own characteristics to foster economic performance. However, the effectiveness of leadership has appeared to be critical in a country's ability to exploit its endowed advantages and turn them into superior performance.
Divergence in Economic Performance
As Vietnam's economic reforms extend back 20 years and China's 30 years, comparative analyses of growth for the two countries can be based on a broad timeframe. The first timeframe for analysis is the initial 20 years of reform for China and 1986-2006 for Vietnam), during which the two countries underwent similar stages of reform and development. The second timeframe is the past 20 years , during which both China and Vietnam were exposed to the same external environment.
To analyse the growth patterns of the two countries, the episodes of sustained growth accelerations for each country or the episodes of growth divergence between the two are identified.
Sustained Growth Acceleration Episode (SGAE)
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Concerning the growth pattern of a country, a period [t, t + k] (from year t to year t + k) is defined as an SGAE if it meets the following conditions:
• k ≥ 5; the SGAE must last at least five years.
• g t -1 > 0; the growth in year t -1, the year before the SGAE, is positive.
• g t + 1 > g t -1 + a for 0 ≤ i ≤ k and a ≥ 2.0%; the growth rate in any year during the period [t, t + k] is higher than the growth rate in the year just before the episode by at least one per cent. This period is called a moderate SGAE if, and a rapid SGAE if 2.0% ≤ a ≤ 3.0%, and a rapid SGAE if a ≥ 3.0%.
Growth Divergence Episode (GDE)
Concerning the growth patterns of two countries X and Y, a period [t, t + k] is defined as a GDE led by country X if the following conditions are met:
• k ≥ 5; the GDE must last at least five years.
• g
; the growth rate of country X is not higher than that of country Y in year t -1, the year just before the GDE.
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Years from the Launching of Reform Index (value in initial year = 100) Note: MAGR5 means 5-year moving average growth rate. Source: WDI. The two SGAEs for Vietnam and China were rather similar in timing. The first SGAE, which started after a few years of reform, was enabled mainly by unshackling resources mismanaged in the old system for more efficient uses driven by market forces. The second SGAE, which started only after 13-14 years of reform, was the result of new investments made during the reform period. Therefore, the magnitude of the first SGAE depended on the severity of previous mismanagement and the decisiveness of the reformist leadership, while the second SGAE was determined by the depth and consistency of reform, which laid the foundation for longer term growth.
Interestingly Source: Author's calculation based on data from WDI.
increased but did so at a slower pace than China's. This observation implies that the growth divergence between these two countries could be even more pronounced in good times than bad.
The Figure 4A, Upper panel) .
More specifically, China's average GDP growth rate over the 20-year reform time frame was 9.8 per cent, exceeding Vietnam's 7.1 per cent by 2.7 per cent and there existed a notable gap between the two countries in each of the four 5-year sub-periods of the first 20-year reform timeframe (Table 3) Figure 4B , Lower panel). In fact, 1992 was the critical year marking a remarkable takeoff in China. This is discussed further below.
Averaged over 1986-2006, China's GDP growth rate was 9.7 per cent, exceeding Vietnam's 7.1 per cent by a gap of 2.6 per cent and there was a significant gap between the two countries' growth for each of the five-year subperiods (Table 3) 
Gaps in Efficiency of Growth
Vietnam has lagged behind China not only quantitatively but also in qualitative terms. This is manifested in the gap in total factor productivity (TFP) growth, the agricultural sector's productivity growth and selected development indicators as discussed below.
TFP Growth
China's TFP growth was significantly higher than Vietnam's, as shown in Table 4 for the period 1986 to 2006. It is important to note that TFP growth for Vietnam during the sub-period 1986 to 1996, when the country was in the first phase of reform, was quite high (4. 
The Agricultural Sector's Productivity Growth
The agricultural sectors in China and Vietnam were very similar at the beginning of their reforms, especially in terms of the sectors' share of employment and the yield per arable hectare. The agricultural sector of both countries enjoyed high growth during the reforms. However, their growth patterns varied in efficiency. With regard to production output, Vietnam outperformed China in both timeframes (Figures 5A and 5B, Upper panel), implying that Vietnam potentially has a distinct competitive advantage in this sector. However, in terms of the agricultural sector's productivity, measured as value added per worker, China grew significantly faster than Vietnam in both time frames ( Figures 5A and 5B, Lower panel) .
The sharp contrast between the two countries in the growth performance of crop production (led by Vietnam) and productivity (led by China) shows a notable gap in the efficiency of growth between the two countries.
Contrasts in Development Indicators
Comparing China and Vietnam on social development indicators reveals a mixed picture. Vietnam appears highly competitive with China in terms of the basic measures of human development. However, Vietnam pales beside China with respect to other indicators such as research productivity, AIDS prevalence and traffic accidents. 
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Basic Human Capital Indicators
Vietnam has caught up with China in life expectancy and school enrolment while markedly surpassing China in terms of child mortality (since 2000), internet penetration (since 2004) and rate of students studying in the US (since 2006) (Table 5) .
Research Productivity
The research productivity of a country can be assessed on the basis of such indicators as the rates of patent applications filed to the local and American patent offices and the rate of published scientific and technical journal articles.
As shown in Table 6 Sources: Author's computation; data from WIPO (for the number of applications filed to the US Patent office) and WDI (for the number of applications filed to the local patent office and the number of scientific and technical journal articles).
Rates of Death caused by AIDS and Traffic Accidents 18
As shown in Table 7 , the rates of death (per 100,000 people) caused by AIDS and traffic accidents were much higher and grew more rapidly in Vietnam than China. It is worth noting that the difference in these rates must be judged with caution because the two countries are vastly different in size and geography. However, the widening of the differences between the two countries on these rates should be taken seriously because it reflects a gap in government effectiveness.
• 
Explaining the Growth Divergence using the Determinants of Growth Model
The growth literature initiated by the seminal work of Barro sheds light on the factors explaining the variations in economic growth performance across countries. 19 These can be grouped into four interrelated categories.
• The initial level of income is expected to have a negative effect on growth. That is, a country with a lower income tends to grow faster than a country with a higher income, all else being equal. This is called the conditional convergence effect.
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• Basic human capital is proxied by various variables such as education (e.g., school enrolment, years of schooling) and health (e.g., life expectancy at birth). These factors have a positive impact on growth. 21 • The variables capturing the quality of institutions include rule of law, 22 property rights, 23 corruption 24 and political instability. 25 According to these studies, better maintenance of the rule of law and property rights has a positive effect, while corruption and political instability have a negative effect on growth.
• Government-related factors include an array of aspects, ranging from the leadership's commitment to reform to government effectiveness. Hausman, Pritchett and Rodrik analysed the growth acceleration patterns of 110 countries over 36 years and the factors underlying those patterns, and found that the most important determinant of sustained acceleration in economic growth is "a major change in economic policy".
Initial Level of Income
Vietnam's per capita income in 1986 was lower than China's by 20 to 30 per cent (Vietnam: US$203, purchasing power parity $1,031; China: US$311, purchasing power parity $1,289). 27 This means that the initial level of income or conditional convergence effect is in favour of Vietnam, and is hence not a factor in explaining China's faster growth performance.
Basic Human Capital
While basic human capital is influenced by policy, it is more fundamentally shaped by social legacies. Vietnam and China have striking similarities in human capital endowment due to their closeness in geography, culture and history. 28 In fact, as presented above, Vietnam is highly competitive with China on the basic measures of human capital, namely educational attainment, health care and information technology penetration. This implies that basic human capital is not a factor causing the growth divergence between China and Vietnam.
Institutions
The differences between China and Vietnam in institutions are based on a set of variables that includes political stability, voice and accountability (an indicator of democracy), rule of law and regulatory quality, as provided by the World Bank Governance Indicators, composed by Kaufmann et al.
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The mean and median of each of these indicators for China and Vietnam are compared to reveal which country has an advantage over the other (see Table 8 ). 
Political Stability
Political stability was defined by Kaufmann et al as "the likelihood that the government will not be destabilised by unconstitutional or violent means, including terrorism". 31 Vietnam is clearly better positioned in this regard than China. Vietnam is comfortably in the positive zone with the mean score (over time) of +0.29, while China is in the negative zone (-0.23). As political stability has a solid impact on investment and growth, this factor should be considered a plus for Vietnam compared to China in its effect on economic growth.
Democracy
Democracy or "voice and accountability" was defined by Kaufmann et al as "the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a media." 32 For this measure, both China and Vietnam are very weak, as their indexes are far below 0. China (-1.52) is a bit weaker than Vietnam (-1.45). On the other hand, Barro points out that "one cannot conclude [from empirical evidence] that more or less democracy is a critical element for economic growth."
33 That is, democracy is not a factor explaining the divergence between China and Vietnam during their economic reforms. 
Rule of Law
Rule of law was defined by Kaufmann et al as "the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, including the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence." 34 Both China and Vietnam are in the negative zone (below the average country) and Vietnam is slightly weaker than China in this measure (-0.54 vs. -0.40). As "rule of law" has a strong impact on growth, this factor should have some effect on the gap in growth performance between China and Vietnam.
Regulatory Quality
As defined by Kaufmann et al., regulatory quality is "the ability of the government to provide sound policies and regulations that enable and promote private sector development". 35 On this measure, both countries are weak, falling in the negative zone. However, China is significantly stronger than Vietnam (-0.27 vs. -0.57). This observation suggests that regulatory quality, to some extent, is a factor causing the China-Vietnam divergence in growth performance.
In summary, the gaps in regulatory quality and to a lesser extent, rule of law are the two institutional factors in which China has some advantage over Vietnam. Vietnam, however, has a clear advantage over China in terms of political stability. Due to these trade-offs, institutions seem not to be the decisive factor explaining the divergence between the two countries.
Leadership and Government Effectiveness
The gap in leadership commitment to reform is measured on the basis of two pieces of evidence: decisiveness in making strategic decisions at critical junctures of economic reform and efforts made to streamline the bureaucracy.
Decisiveness in making strategic decisions at critical junctures
As noted above, there were moments marking notable divergences between China and Vietnam in growth, especially in the industry and service sectors. The critical moments were an uptick in growth in China in 1991 and a slowdown in Vietnam's growth in 1999 ( Figures 4A and 4B, Lower panel) .
After the first ten years of reform, both China and Vietnam had been able to escape from economic hardship and enter a more comfortable stage of development, but a stage in which it was harder to make decisive and difficult decisions. The economic reforms have made China and Vietnam deviate farther from their ideology of socialism. This may have seriously upset some influential members of the leadership, whose power was based on loyalty to the past rather than future achievements.
The two forces mentioned had put China (in the early 1990s) as well as Vietnam (in the late 1990s) at risk of falling into political deadlock and indecisiveness in making strategic decisions. In this situation, the leadershiprelated factors such as vision, decisiveness and execution capability played a critical role in decisively moving the economic reforms forward.
For China in 1991, Chen Yun, the most powerful leader after Deng Xiaoping in post-Tiananmen China, along with his allies launched a series of attacks against reform, including a call for abolishing special economic zones. 36 Facing these critical challenges, Deng Xiaoping did not compromise, and instead decided to undertake a pre-emptive step by launching a trip to southern China in January 1992 to rally support for accelerating reforms.
Deng's trip is believed to have "produced both short-term and long-term effects on China's political and economic development" although "the economic effects are far more clear-cut". 37 Economic growth surged from 9 per cent from 1978 to 1991 to 12 per cent from 1991 to 1996, while total FDI flows amounted to US$156 billion over 1991 to 1996 compared to US$23.3 billion for 1978 to 1991 (see Table 1 ).
38
For Vietnam, a slowdown in reform efforts was observed some time after 1995, which cumulated in Vietnam's refusal to sign a trade agreement with the United States in 1999. As a US trade official involved in this process noted, "When you compare this to the effort put forward by China during 36 However, it is important to note that Vietnam signed the trade agreement in July 2000, just less than one year after its initial refusal. Also in 1999, Vietnam passed the enterprise law, only five years after China's own passing of its enterprise law (Table 2) , which marked a prominent change in the creation of a level playing field for Vietnam's business sector. These examples reveal that the Vietnamese leadership, while lacking foresight and decisiveness in making strategic decisions, was willing and able to make significant changes once they became obviously necessary.
Streamlining the bureaucracy
China and Vietnam are both burdened with a large and overstaffed public sector, which is among the main causes of red tape, corruption, incompetence and inefficiency. Therefore, streamlining the public sector is a good indicator of the depth of a country's commitment to reform. In this endeavour, China and Vietnam have gone in opposite directions. As shown in Table 9 , China consistently and drastically reduced its public sector's share of employment relative to the entire economy by 27 per cent between 1995 and 2000 and by 22 
Government Effectiveness
In addition to the leadership's commitment to reform, government effectiveness is critical to the performance of a country. Vietnam is notably below China in terms of the World Bank measure of government effectiveness, as shown in Figure 6 The gap in government effectiveness between the two countries can also be seen in the pace of SOE sector reforms, control of corruption, pattern of energy consumption and efficacy of openness.
Pace of SOE Sector Reforms
The SOE sector has been problematic for both China and Vietnam, but Vietnam has been far behind China in reforming it. Perkins pointed out that Vietnam was much less reliant on market forces than was China in reforming the SOE sector. In Vietnam, as of 1998, only a dozen state firms were corporatized, while the number in China was in the many thousands. Shareholding could become the vehicle for creating boards of directors who would ensure that plant managers concentrated mainly on making profits rather than on pleasing their government and party superiors". 43 and "The mergers and acquisitions process in China, therefore, has begun to take on some of the characteristics of similar processes in market economies, although the government's role remains large. [At the same time], Vietnam's government-directed approach in creating state-owned conglomerates, following the Japanese and Korean models appears to be little more than a repackaging of existing arrangements without a change in business behaviour.
[…] It is hard to see what contribution these new, larger units will make to Vietnam's international competitiveness". 44 With regard to privatisation, China has also been more effective than Vietnam. As shown in 
The Control of Corruption
Institutions (such as transparency, democracy) and government effectiveness (such as strong leadership, execution capability) have a major impact on the control of corruption. As discussed above, institutions in both China and Vietnam remain weak. As a result, corruption is a serious problem in both countries and their success in controlling this problem remains limited. However, China has been consistently rated above Vietnam on this effort, as indicated by the gap between them in the Transparency International (TI) Index (Figure 6 , lower panel). China's higher score on control of corruption is mainly due to its more effective government. In fact, China and Vietnam have handled the scandals associated with high-ranking officials very differently. In solving these cases, the Chinese leadership has demonstrated their highest level of toughness and resolution, while the Vietnamese leadership has shown a reluctance to be decisive in these efforts. The most notable evidence is Japan's decision in December 2008 to suspend development aid to Vietnam in order to press the government to take stronger measures to fight corruption.
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Patterns of Energy Consumption
Energy is increasingly becoming a scarce and strategic resource. Thus, reducing the energy intensity of a country's economic development implies wisdom and strategic thinking. The energy consumption patterns of the two countries indicate that China is more strategically effective than Vietnam on this issue (Table 11 ). The energy intensity of China's economy, measured as kilograms of oil equivalent per US$1,000 of GDP, was 1.95 in 1990, much higher than that of Vietnam (1.62). However, China decisively reduced this intensity from 0. 
Efficacy of Openness
Openness has a significant positive impact on economic growth. 46 On the two widely-used metrics of openness -the ratio of total trade to GDP and the weighted mean of tariffs, Vietnam is more open than China. 47 Since the launch of the reforms in 1986, Vietnam has rapidly increased its openness to the world. These simple openness measures, therefore, do not explain why Vietnam has lagged behind China in growth performance.
This calls for a deeper investigation into the efficacy of openness of the two countries with respect to their integration into the world economy. It is obvious that the two countries have achieved rapid growth in both exports and imports. However, China's exports have grown faster than its imports, while the reverse pattern was observed for Vietnam (Figure 7) . The findings suggest that China has been more strategic than Vietnam in both exports and imports with a notable push made in moving up the technol- The analyses reveal a significant gap in the efficacy of openness between the two countries, which is related to the effectiveness of each country's government in carrying out industrial policy. The analyses also explain why simple measures of openness, such as trade-to-GDP, are not robust predictors of the variation in growth.
Conclusion
This study provides important insights into the determinants of economic growth and growth divergence in China and Vietnam. The two countries initiated their economic reforms from comparable economic and social conditions and have followed rather similar approaches to reform and economic management. Since the launch of reforms, both countries have made impressive achievements in their growth performance. However, their growth patterns have significantly diverged. China has far outperformed Vietnam in both the pace and efficiency of growth. This parallels a gap between the Asian Tigers such as Korea and Taiwan on the one hand and ASEAN economies such as Indonesia and Thailand on the other.
This study finds that the growth divergence between China and Vietnam is substantial not only quantitatively but also qualitatively, and that the gap in economic growth between the two countries enlarged during good times, when both countries accelerated their growth with China outperforming Vietnam. A key finding was that disparity in government effectiveness has been the main factor explaining the divergence in economic performance. This paper suggests that for a developing country where institutional quality is usually weak and takes a long time to develop, enhancing government effectiveness is a critical step in fostering economic performance and creating the necessary conditions for upgrading institutional performance.
This study also shows that while China has an advantage in government effectiveness, its institutional foundation remains weak, which is rather comparable with Vietnam. Simple indicators such as the trade-to-GDP ratio for openness or schooling for human capital are not robust predictors of variations in economic growth.
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